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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BANK OF EPHRAIM,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 14514

HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY STEINMANN,
BABYLON CORPORATION, PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS, FIRST STATE BANK,
UTAH STATE TAX CO~MISSION, AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Sixth
Judidial District Court as to the priorities of certain
judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court awarded Judgment on a Decree of
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim,
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
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Association and the Utah State Tax Corunission as pert'.,
Complaints of each creditor.

The rights of the defenda:·

Steinmann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon
Corporation.

The defendants First State Bank and

~it~

States of America were previously dismissed as parties
defendant to the action.
In its judgment and decree of foreclosure

t~

District Court in addition to a\-Tarding Judgments to the
judgment creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments
of each creditor, as is set forth in the Statement
It is from these priorities that the plaintiff

of?~

appellar.~

appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court declare
that the trial court was in error in granting the defend:Babylon Corporation and Prudential Federal Savings prior::
on their judgments ahead of the entire judgment of the r~:
tiff.
STATE~lliNT

OF FACTS

There are generally no controversies concernin~:
facts of the case which are basically as follows:
The case involves three parcels of propertY M~
cribed below:
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PARCEL 1
Beginning at a point 1.94 chains North from the
Southwest corner of Block 57 as platted in Plat
"A" t-lanti City S:lrvey, thence East 4.20 chains,
thence N?rth 33° West, along Manti City Creek,
1.10 chalns, the~ce West 3.55 chains, thence
South 1.00 chain to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 2
Beginning at a point 234.96 feet South, thence
129 feet East from the Northwest corner of Block
57, as platted in Plat "A" Manti City Survey,
thence North 48° East 14 feet, thence North 40.25
feet, thence East 66 feet, thence South 49.50 feet,
thence West 76.33 feet to beginning. 0.465 acres.
PARCEL 3
All of Lot 9, Block 44, Plat "A", Manti City Survey,
Sanpete County, State of Utah, containing 0.60 acre,
more or less
Parcels 1 and 2 have a cafe known as Hals Palace
Cafe, as an improvement and shall be hereafter referred to
as the cafe property.
Parcel 3 is a trailer court and shall hereafter be
referred to as the trailer property.
CAFE PROPERTY:
On the 7th day of August, 1970 the defendant, Halbert
Davis mortgaged to the Bank of Ephraim the Cafe Property and
signed a note at the time for the sum of $2,400.00.
On the face of the mortgage is typed a clause which reads:

-

3

~
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"This mortgage covers all additional advan~s
on this loan, the total principal amount not to exce~

$3,000.00."
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgac
reads:
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or
renewals and successive extensions or renewals, of then:·
above described, or of the indebtedness represented by r
same, and of any other indebtedness at any time existinq
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represente~.
notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the i ...
est on all of the same, all of which extensions or rene··:.
shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the mortga0"
option may be made by new notes or otherwise and at, be:o:
or after maturity, and for all of which this mortgage sho:
stand as a continuing security until paid."
On August 7, 1970 the defendant Halbert Davis ga·.·
a second mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann and signeda
Promissory Note in favor of Steven Kaye Steinmann in thE'
of $14,500.00.

Both the note and the mortgage were subs':

ly assig1.cd to the d.:fendant Babylon Corporation.
The mortgage to Steven Kaye Steinmann expressly"
forth the fact that i t was secondary to the mortgage to:
Bank of Ephraim.
On June 6, 1972 the defendant Halbert Davis exeC':·
a Promissory Note to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of

$35,555.89.

- 4 -
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On June 21, 1972 defendant Davis execut ed an
installment note and mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Association in the sum of $4,073.40.

This amount

was later absorbed in the subsequent installment note and
mortgage of October 19, 1972 in the sum of $10,228.80.
On April 5, 1973 the defendant Halbert Davis executed
a Promissory NOte to the Bank of Ephraim in the sum of
$2,000.00 and on June 19, 1974 Davis executed a Promissory
Note to Bank of Ephraim in the sum of $5,384.00.
Further, on March 19, 1974 defendant Davis delivered
to Plaintiff, Bank of Ephraim, its note in the sum of $5,500.00
which is set forth in the Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief.
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is
represented by delinquent tax warrants for delinquent sales,
unemployment and Income Tax.
At the time of the trial on January 5, 1976 all the
parties presented evidence which the court took under advisement and later awarded judgment as follows:
(a)
To the Bank of Ephraim, $43,037.00 Principal,
$6,536.75 interest and $3,000.00 attorney's fees
for a total judgment of $52,573.75, and Decree of
Foreclosure on the cafe property.
(b)
To the Babylon Corporation, $13,269.52 principal,
$1,126.00 interest, $40.00 title report, $2,000.00
Attorney's fee for a total judgment of $16,435.52 and
a Decree of Foreclosure on the Cafe property.
- 5 -
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(c) To Prudential Federal Savings, $5,833.33 principal
$25.00 title report, $900.00 attorney's fees for a tot~J
Judgment of $6,750.33 and a Decree of Foreclosure on the
Cafe property.
(d)

To the Utah State Tax Commission, $2,766.73.

(e)

To the Bank of Ephraim on its Third Cause of Action,
$900.00 attorney's fees and $996.11
interest for a total Judgment of $7,396.11 and a Decree:
Foreclosure on the Cafe property.
$5,500.00 principal,

The court then assigned the following priorities on the
Cafe Property:

(1)

Bank of Ephraim
Plus interest at 10% per annum from
2/22/74

Plus reasonable attorney's fee of
Plus costs of Court in the sum of

(2)

Babylon Corporation
Plus reasonable attorney fees of
Plus interest at 8% per annum from
date

(3)

Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association
Plus interest at 10% per annum
Plus Sttorney's fees

$3 ,000,(
600.1
27 .l
14,395.:
2,000J

5' 83l.i

900 .~

(4)

Balance of Judgments to Bank of Ephraim
including amounts found due on its
Third Cause of Action

(5)

State of Utah Tax Warrants

2' 766.

TRAILER COURT PROPERTY:
On March 15, 1971 defendant, Davis, executed a
Promissory Note in the amount of $4,000.00 in favor oft~
Bank of Ephraim, which was secured by a mortgage on the
trailer park property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On the fact of this mortgage is typed a clause which reads:
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on
this loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $6,000.00."
Paragraph 2 of the printed portion of the mortgage reads:
"To secure payment of any and all extensions or
renewals, and successive extensions or renewals, of the
note above described, or of the indebtedness represented
by the same, and of any other indebtedness, at any time arising from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, whether represented
by notes, drafts, open account or otherwise, and all the
interest on all of the same, all of which extensions or renewals shall be optional with the mortgagee, but at the
mortgagee's option may be made by new notes or otherwise
and at, before, or after maturity, and for all of which the
mortgage shall stand as a continuing security until paid."
On June 21, 1972, defendant Davis obtained a loan
from Prudential Federal which was superceded by its subsequent loan on October 16, 1972.

This loan is the same as

the loan covered by the Cafe property above, Prudential's
mortgage covering both

parc~ls

of property.

Thereafter, on July 31, 1974 by an additional
Promissory Note, Halbert Davis borrowed an additional
$1,508.41 on the trailer court property from the Plaintiff.
The interest of the Utah State Tax Commission is the
same as on the cafe property.
The defendant Babylon Corporation is not an interesed
party in the trailer court property.
The evidence on the trailer court was submitted to
the court as was done on the Cafe property and the court
a\·Tarded
judgment
follows:
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law as
Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(a)

To the Bank of Ephraim ' $5 , 508 • 41 pr- rncrpal,
·
$941.48 interest, $750.00 attorney's
fee f or a t 0

judgrnent of $7,229.89, and a Decree of Foreclosu:
on the trailer property.
(b)
To Prudential Federal Savings the same judgro
as given on the Cafe property.
(c)
To Utah State Tax Commission - same judgment
as on Cafe property.
The court then assigned the following priorities,
trailer property:
(1)

Bank of Ephraim
$5,508.41
Plus interest of
971.4<
Plus reasonable attorney fee of
750.0J
and interest at rate of 8% from date
of Judgment until paid

(2)

Prudential Federal Savings
Same as in Cafe property.

(3)

Bank of Ephraim
Balance of indebtedness owned on
all obligations
Utah State Tax Commission
Same as in Cafe property

(1)

It is from the decision of the Court assign~g&
priori ties as to the Cafe property from which the plainti:
takes this appeal.

Plaintiff does not contest the prion:

of the court as they apply to the trailer property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARAGRAPH 2(s'

OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN AWARDING THE JUDGNENTS OF
DEFENDANT BABYLON CORPORATION AND PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL

S!Y;

PRIORITY OVER THE BALANCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE BX.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Plaintiff's position as supported by the
authorities cited below is that all the promissory notes
and mortgage by which the notes are secured are a first
priority over all other lien claims.
The plaintiff admits at the beginning that the
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and
not obligatory under the mortgage.
The contention of the Defendant Prudential Federal
Savings at the time of trial was that since the advances
made by the bank were optional, that the lien priority is
determined as of the time the advances were actually made,
and that in no event should the lien priority exceed $3,000.00
as set forth on the face of the mortgage.
The problem with this is that the bulk of the advances made by the Bank of Ephraiht on the Cafe property
were prior to the time Prudential Federal Savings made its
loan.

This is obviously why Prudential urges the $3,000.00

limitation.
To adopt this position, however, one has to take the
position that we should hold to one clause of the mortgage
and not to another.

Paragraph 2 of the mortgage plainly

includes all other loans of whatever nature.
The defendant Prudential and all other claimants
had notice of that clause, for it was on file and they only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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had to inquire of the Bank of Ephraim as to any amounts
loaned under the mortgage before they extended any money
themselves.
Moreover, the finding of the court in regard to
priorities is a little conflicting.

The court holds the

Bank of Ephraim has a valid mortgage against the defendan:
Davis for the full amount of the monies loaned, but says
that the priorities extend to only $3,000.00.

If Paragra(

2 of the mortgage is binding upon the defendant Davis, wh'
isn't it binding on the other parties defendant?

Plainti'

contention is that its priority is not limited by :the

$3,000.00 figure in the mortgage and that it mould be giV"
priority at a minimum for the advances made before interve
ing encumbrances were made.

Plaintiff further contends U

Paragraph 2 of the mo£tgage is sufficient to give itpri~
over all lien holders.
A number of cases in various jurisdictions have d;
with the above situation and while some of these cases hJ,
held that advances made on a first mortgage after a secon:
mortgage are secondary to the second mortgage in terms of
priority, i t is likewise true that a number of cases have
a mortgage of property given in good faith to secure futu
advances is not regarded as invalid as against the hold9r

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of intervening subsequent interests.

Kentucky Lumber

& Mill Co. v. Kentucky Title Sav. Bank and T. Co., 184

Ky 244, 211 S W 765; Batten v. Jurist; 306 Pa. 64, 158 A 557.
The generally prevailing doctrine seems to be that
advances made under a recorded mortgage given to secure
further optional advances will not be denied priority in lien
merely because the intervening encumbrancer could not have
determined from the mortgage, without extraneous inquiry,
the true amount of the indebtedness of advances secured
thereby.

Hurst v. Flynn-Harris-Ballard Co.

143 SE 503:

Exerist v. Carter 202 Iowa 498, 210 NW 559; Merchants
State Bank v. Tufts
Mere. Co. v. Hause

14 ND 238, 103 Nvl 760; Lawn Sprinkle
Tex Civ App 184 SW 737.

The case before the bar is very similar to the above
in that Prudential Federal Savings could have determined the
amount of indebtedness on the Bank of Ephraim mortgage by a
simple inquiry of the Bank.
Although there is contrary authority, the rule laid
down in most cases is that an advance, though purely optional,
made pursuant to a mortgage of which subsequent parties had
record or other sufficient notice, is a lien or charge superior to an encumbrance intervening between the giving of
the mortgage and the making of the advance, if the mortgagee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- ll Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had no knowledge and no actual notice of the intenen~~
encumbrance.

Savings

&

Loan Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal.s;;

30 P. 922, Schmidt v. Zahrndt
Passaic Nat Bank

&

148 Ind. 447, 47 NE 335,

Trust Co.v. Owens., lll N J Ea 486 l6i

A 879, Hall v. Williamson Aro. Co.

69 W Va 671, 72 SE 7'

While the Bar1k of Ephraim may have had construe:;
notice by reason of the recording of the Prudential mortg'
they had no actual notice and in fact, the lions hare oft
advances made by the plaintiff Bank were prior in time tc
those of Prudential Federal Savings.
Even if the Plaintiff had had actual notice of tf.'
Second Mortgage, there is authority to support the propos·
ition that the lien of an advance made under a mortgage tc
secure optional future advances
persons hc.d record

01.·

(of which mortgage subseqv

other sufficient notice) takes prio:

over an encumbrance intervening between the giving of tf,
mortgage and the making of the advance, even though the
mortgagee had actual notice or knowledge of the interveJi:
encumbrance.
Everman,
App)

Gray v. Helm

60 Miss 131, Hitczinski v.

51 Miss 841; First Nat. Bank v. Zarafonetis (Tex

15 SW 2d 155.
The general rule would seem to be that before a

can be de·
holder of a mortgage to secure future advances
notice o£
prived of his superior equity on the ground of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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intervening interest, actual notice thereof must be brought
to his attention.

Farmers Union Warehouse Co. v. Barnett

Bros. 273 Ala 435, 137 So. 176, Topia v. Demartini 77 Cal
383, 19 P 641; Corn Belt Trust & Sav. Bank vs.May.

197 Iowa

54, 196 NW 735.
No where in the record is there any evidence that
the plaintiff had any actual notice of the mortgage to
Prudential Federal Savings.
It is further of interest that the Utah Supereme
Court seems never to have squarely come to grips with this
question.

Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham 11

U 2d 159, 356 P 2d 281 seems to uphold the position of Prudential Federal Savings on first reading, but a more careful
reading shows two things,
1.

That the actual holding of the court was to

remand the case back to the District Court for more definite
findings and thus any statement made as to priority of liens
is dicta.
2.

That the case actually involved the question of

priority of liens of a mortgage and subsequent liens on
material men under our mechanics lien statute.
Thus the Utah Courts have never actually determined
the question of priority and the only case may be clearly
seen as not being in point.
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As a matter of fact, nearly all the cases

whi~

hold for the position of Prudential Federal Savings

~w

dealt with priority as i t exists between the mortgagee
and intervening materials men.
There are some very good reasons to distinguish t,
materials men cases from the case at hand, one being the
fact that in a materialsmen case the mortgagee making the
subsequent advances has every reason to know or believe tt.
the money he advances will be used to make improvements wL
immediately raises the probability of a materialsmen lien.
This is not the case with a second mortgagee.
The Steinmann or Babylon morrgage is no different
than the Prudential Mortgage except that the advances by
the Bank were all made after the giving of the Steinmann
mortgage by the defendant Davis.
It is evidently clear that Steinmann knew of the
mortgage to Bank of Ephraim as she expressly made her roor:·
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim.

She nc:

only had construction notice by actual notice of the mort:
but was aware of the Provisions of Paragraph 2 of the mot:''
She further knew that the defendant Davis was pal:
to make a cafe out of the property, and that the Plainti'
would be advancing large sums of money to the defendant'·
for the needed improvement of the property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONCLUSION
The contention of the Plaintiff Bank of Ephraim
is that Paragraph 2 of its mortgage does not place dollar
limitations on it which limits its priority, that there is
further clear authority to support the priority of its
advances over any intervening liens and that on the basis
of the notice and our statutes, this court should grant
priority to the plaintiffs over all the lien claimants
and remand the case back for Findings of Fact consistent
therewith.

e~pectfu..~y-sub~l.·t/ted,

c' . u;~·-·FZr;m-OUIS G. ERVORT
RISCH ECHT & TERVORT
Attorneys for the
Plaintiff-Appellants
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